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Abstract: 
The most trenchant critiques of Western international law are framed around the legacy of its 
historic complicity in the imperial project of governing non-European peoples. International 
law organised Europe and its ‘others’ into a hierarchy of civilizational difference that was only 
ever reconfigured but never overturned. But when analysing the complex relationship 
between international law and imperialism the differences within Europe—as opposed to a 
dyadic opposition of Europe versus the ‘rest'—also matter. Within the historical and political 
constellations of the early and mid-twentieth century, German difference produced a set of 
arguments that challenged dominant discourses of international law by posturing as anti-
imperial critique. This article focuses on the global career of Friedrich Berber (1898-1984) 
who, as a legal adviser in Nazi Germany and Nehru’s India, was at the forefront of state-led 
challenges to liberal international law. Berber fused notions of German civilizational 
superiority with an appropriation of Indian colonial victimhood, and pursued a shared politics 
of opposition. He embodies a version of German-Indian entanglement which did not abate 
after the Second World War, emphasizing the long continuities of empire, power differentials, 
civilizational hierarchies and developmental logics under the umbrella of international law. 
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The legacy of colonial rule is a key theme in the history of modern international law. The 
colonial encounter was central to the emergence of international law as a discipline and as a 
practise among states. International lawyers formulated a ‘standard of civilization’ which 
effectively excluded non-Europeans from the community of sovereign states under 
international law unless they adopted Western forms of political organization. The mandates 
system of the League of Nations purported to lead colonised peoples to sovereignty after the 
First World War but only entrenched economic inequality, replacing overtly racist definitions 
of civilization with economic benchmarks of ‘backwardness’. After the Second World War, 
international law offered only limited sovereignty to the ‘underdeveloped’ states emerging in 
the era of decolonization, thus ensuring continued dominance of the West over the ‘rest’. 
Ultimately, as Antony Anghie and others have shown, imperialism remains so embedded in 
modern international law that it has never been overcome but only reconfigured.2  
  Nevertheless, postcolonial states continued to engage with international law, despite 
the limits to its universalism. Legal scholars have explained this with reference to the ‘critical 
instability’ at the heart of international law which is rooted in its promise to deliver justice and 
equality in the future, regardless of its deficiencies in the present. As Sundhya Pahuja has 
argued, “a universal orientation is unavoidable if there is to be law” but “even if the claim to 
universality is a familiar mode of power, it is nevertheless an unstable one, for it is always 
implanted with the seeds of its own excess”.3 In this reading, international law helps to 
create the conditions for its own subversion, and it is the contention that international law 
can be both imperial and counter-imperial that lies at the heart of this article. 
 The relationship between international law and empire is complex for another reason: 
international law’s standard of civilization also produced differences within Europe, notably 
after the First World War when decades of legal optimism about a ‘civilized’, European way 
of warfare came to an end.4 European imperialism and civilizational exceptionalism now 
provided a lexicon for scrutinising the belligerents’ conduct, and the defeated German 
Empire stood at the centre of these debates. The Allies condemned German practices 
which, they argued, proved that it was not civilized enough to be a colonial ruler. Germans 
indignantly denied this but also began to imagine themselves as ‘colonised’ victims of an 
                                                          
2 Antony Anghie, Imperialism, sovereignty and the making of international law, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005; Martti Koskenniemi, The gentle civilizer of nations: the rise and fall of international law, 
1870-1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000; Lauren Benton, A search for sovereignty: law and 
geography in European empires, 1400–1900, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
3 Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising international law: development, economic growth and the politics of 
universality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 41. See also Pahuja’s perceptive review of 
Anghie in Modern Law Review, 69, 3, 2006, pp. 486-488. 
4 Koskenniemi, Gentle civilizer, p. 87; Anghie, Imperialism, p. 189. For the war’s destabilising impact see Robert 
Gerwarth and Erez Manela, eds., Empires at war, 1911-1923, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. 
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inequitable new world order.5 This constellation made it possible for Germans to envisage a 
shared politics with others who challenged liberal empire and one of its political 
technologies, international law. 
 There was significant historical momentum behind this challenge. Cultural contacts 
with and scholarship on the ‘East’ provided a resource for Germans questioning 
conventional ideas about European civilisation in the course of the 19th century. India 
became an important reference point for them. German Indophilia and indology belonged to 
an Orientalist tradition which, as Suzanne Marchand has argued, entailed seeking 
connections with Eastern culture beyond a mere ‘othering’ of the East. Orientalism helped 
Germans carve out a distinct place in a European civilisation the unity of which was 
increasingly in question, certainly in the context of intensifying imperial rivalries from the 
1880s onwards. Of course real power differentials underpinned German-Indian intellectual 
contact and exchange. After the First World War many Germans wanted to rejoin the ranks 
of colonial powers while Indians sought to throw off the yoke of imperial oppression. But 
Indians and Germans needed each other to pick away at Anglo-centric intellectual and 
political hegemony. As Kris Manjapra has shown, Indian nationalism gained from the 
exchange international recognition beyond the British Empire, while German Orientalism 
repudiated the idea of Western civilisation as anchored in the liberal democracies of Western 
Europe.6 
 This article analyses how Germans attempted to make the inherent paradox of 
international law, its imperialising and anti-imperial tendencies, work to effect geopolitical 
change in the context of German-Indian entanglements. I focus on the global career of 
Friedrich Berber (1898-1984) who as a scholar and legal adviser in Nazi Germany and 
Nehruvian India was at the forefront of state-led challenges to international law’s 
mainstream. In some ways, Berber’s biography represents a familiar story, marked by 
involvement in the Nazi regime and subsequent attempts to come to terms with this past. His 
activities between 1933 and 1945 have attracted some scholarly attention but compared to 
well-known Nazi jurists such as Carl Schmitt or Werner Best Berber remains an obscure 
figure.7 Yet the Anglo-world loomed large in Berber’s life. His membership in transnational 
                                                          
5 John N. Horne and Alan Kramer, German atrocities, 1914: a history of denial, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2001, pp. 216-223; Uta Poiger, ‘Imperialism and empire in twentieth-century Germany’, History and 
Memory, 17, 1, 2005, pp. 117-143, at p. 122. 
6 Suzanne Marchand, German Orientalism in the age of empire: religion, race, and scholarship, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009; Kris Manjapra, Age of entanglement: German and Indian intellectuals across 
empire, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2014. 
7 Reinhard Mehring, Carl Schmitt: Aufstieg und Fall, Munich: C.H. Beck, 2009; Ulrich Herbert, Best: 
Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft, 1903-1989, Bonn: Dietz, 1996; on 
Berber see Carl H. Paußmeyer, ‘Die Grundlagen nationalsozialistischer Völkerrechtstheorie als ideologischer 
Rahmen für die Geschichte des Instituts für Auswärtige Politik, 1933-1945’, in Klaus Jürgen Gantzel, ed., 
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networks centred on Britain and the United States positioned him between those who 
dominated the international legal order and those in opposition. These connections also 
enabled him to implement legal knowledge in the Global South in the 1950s by advising 
India on a water dispute with Pakistan.  
 Berber was not an anti-imperialist. His position may more accurately be 
characterised as counter-imperial, proposing an alternative way of Eurocentric ordering, as 
he first appropriated Indian colonial victimhood to carve out a distinct position within 
Europe’s own struggles about the meaning of Western sovereignty, and then put forward a 
vision of supranational organisation that cast Germany as a civiliser apart from other 
Western powers. It was as a representative of the West that Berber advised Nehru’s 
government and his attitudes to India were deeply Orientalist. Berber’s oppositional legal 
knowledge emerged out of a specific political constellation that enabled him to challenge 
accepted norms of international law both during the Third Reich and the post-war period of 
‘decolonization’.8 Ultimately, his trajectory points towards the necessity of writing a history of 
international law that is not limited by a dualistic framing of ‘West’ versus ‘rest’, and takes 
seriously the complex and contradictory orderings that result from its imperial legacy. 
 
Law and empire after 1919 
It is hard to over-emphasise the devastating impact of the First World War on the credibility 
of Eurocentric international law. “The late war”, wrote an Indian observer “was waged in 
contravention of the accepted law of nations and in defiance of all notions of international 
morality”. Not only were European states caught flouting international law, those who 
professed to be able to say what international law actually was had been exposed as 
fantasists. “The practice among states is thus contrary to the high-sounding theories of 
publicists, prize courts, congresses and conferences.” This conclusion inspired legal 
scholars in India to recover indigenous traditions of international law based on ancient 
practise, for instance the doctrine of equity, justice and good conscience. Indirectly, their 
accounts contrasted legal order in India with European anarchy. Descriptions of ancient 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Kolonialrechtswissenschaft, Kriegsursachenforschung, Internationale Angelegenheiten: Materialien und 
Interpretationen zur Geschichte des Instituts für Internationale Angelegenheiten der Universität Hamburg, 
1923-1983 im Widerstreit der Interessen, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1983, pp. 115-158; Hermann Weber, ‘Von 
Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy zu Ernst Forsthoff. Die Hamburger Rechtsfakultat im Zeitpunkt des 
Machtübergangs 1933 bis 1935’ in Gantzel, Kolonialrechtswissenschaft, Kriegsursachenforschung, 
Internationale Angelegenheiten, pp. 159-181; Hermann Weber, ‘Rechtswissenschaft im Dienst der NS-
Propaganda. Das Institut für Auswärtige Politik und die deutsche Völkerrechtsdoktrin in den Jahren 1933 bis 
1945’, in Klaus Jürgen Gantzel, ed., Wissenschaftliche Verantwortung und Politische Macht, Hamburger 
Beiträge zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 2, Berlin: Reimer, 1986, pp. 185-425; on Vergangenheitsbewältigung see 
Philipp Gassert and Alan E. Steinweis, eds., Coping with the Nazi past: West German debates on Nazism and 
generational conflict, 1955/1975, New York; Oxford: Berghahn, 2006. 
8 International law’s continued imperial ordering necessitates a critical use of the term. 
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Indian laws that enshrined respect for enemy property and sites of religious worship invoked 
images of European outrages such as the shelling of Rheims cathedral by the German 
army.9 Indian legal scholars hardly differentiated between violations of international law by 
the Entente and the Central Powers. The point was that the way European powers had 
behaved in wartime made the idea that they were fit to spread civilization in their colonies 
highly dubious. 
 Among European and American observers the principal outlaw in the war had been 
Germany. Its violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, the atrocities it 
committed against civilians and prisoners of war, and its use of new weapons were roundly 
condemned by Allies and neutrals. Moreover, Germany’s reliance on military necessity as an 
excuse for flouting the laws of war radically challenged international legal universalism. If, as 
German jurists and politicians argued, states had to be free to pursue their interests 
unhindered by law, a German victory in the First World War would have created a lawless 
world. The Allies did not escape with their reputations as law-abiding powers entirely intact. 
Britain’s blockade of the Central Powers was controversial even if some scholars have 
recently interpreted it as legal innovation.10 It is fair to say, though, that Germany 
comprehensively lost the legal argument during the First World War. 
 Defeat in war also cost Germany its empire. It lost colonies and concessions in 
Africa, the Pacific and China as well as its contiguous imperial holdings in Europe. As a 
result, Germany became the first postcolonial European nation in a world still structured by 
colonialism. The Allied occupation of the Rhineland inverted accepted civilizational 
hierarchies and many Germans supported a racist campaign against the stationing of African 
soldiers in France’s zone of occupation. In German eyes, a Kulturvolk was being 
‘colonized’.11 Germany’s distinct experience of imposed decolonisation gave rise to a 
Eurocentric critique of colonialism that assessed other European powers according to their 
ability to civilise their colonial subjects and simultaneously portrayed Germany as the 
colonized victim. 
                                                          
9 S.V. Viswanatha, International law in ancient India, Bombay: Longmans, 1925, quotes at pp. 3-4; 
Pramathanath Bandyopadhyay, International law and custom in ancient India, Calcutta: Calcutta University 
Press, 1920; Bimal Patel, ‘India’, in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, The Oxford handbook of the history of 
international law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 500-521. 
10 Isabel V. Hull, A scrap of paper: breaking and making international law during the Great War, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2014.  
11 Marcia Klotz, ‘The Weimar Republic: a postcolonial state in a still-colonial world’, in Eric Ames, Marcia Klotz 
and Lora Wildenthal, eds., Germany's colonial pasts, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2005, pp. 135-147; 
Julia Roos, ‘Women's rights, nationalist anxiety, and the “moral” agenda in the early Weimar Republic: 
revisiting the “black horror” campaign against France's African occupation troops’, Central European History, 
42, 3, 2009, pp. 473-508; Dirk van Laak, Imperiale Infrastruktur: Deutsche Planungen für eine Erschließung 
Afrikas 1880 bis 1960, Paderborn: Schöningh, 2004, p. 210. 
K. Rietzler 
Journal of Global History,  
11.1 (2016) 
 
6 
 Friedrich (Fritz) Berber came of age during this time of destabilised imperial 
boundaries. Not yet twenty at the Armistice of 1918 Berber began his law studies in Munich, 
a centre of political radicalism. His earliest writings fused resentment against the Versailles 
Diktat with calls for solidarity among those oppressed by the ‘West’. In a pamphlet published 
by a Christian youth group, Berber argued that the world’s territory had to be distributed in 
an “equitable” way. “It is inequitable that a country with a declining population possesses an 
overabundance of colonies, whereas a rapidly growing people are deprived of all areas of 
settlement. This perspective on international politics means that, for instance, the question of 
Indian freedom is also our question, and the question of Versailles is that of the entire world.” 
Asking for the restitution of German colonies in the same breath as campaigning for Indian 
national liberation may seem paradoxical. Berber, however, asserted that Germany’s 
shameful treatment at the hands of the victors of the world war had made its population 
“suffer more deeply from the tragedy that exists all around us than elsewhere” and gave 
Germans a unique insight into world politics, distinct from that of other Europeans.12 Berber 
was not alone in fusing sympathy for anticolonial movements with visions for a German 
colonial rebirth. Conservative publicists, for example, supported sizeable diasporic 
communities of Indian students and activists in Berlin and Munich.13  
 Religion was another influence on Berber. His father had been a preacher in the 
Methodist church, an isolated minority at odds with the quasi-religious nationalism of imperial 
Germany due to the church’s links with foreign communities of faith.14 Berber’s early 
thoughts on reforming international politics centred on individual spiritual renewal and “man, 
as he ought to be, man redeemed”.15 As a student, Berber moved in reformist Christian 
circles and throughout his life remained open to alternative forms of spirituality. He became 
affiliated with the Anglophone Protestant ecumenical movement, joining the World’s Student 
Christian Federation at the peak of its influence.16 He also forged contacts to the British 
Society of Friends (Quakers) and allegedly converted to Quakerism, possibly because its 
                                                          
12 Fritz Berber, ‘Von der Gerechtigkeit’, in: Zwischen den Bünden: Drei Vorträge aus dem Jugendring München, 
Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1924, pp. 24-37, quotes at p. 30, 35. 
13 Manjapra, Age of entanglement, pp. 88-106, 162-163, 203-4. 
14 Archives of Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich, NL-064, Friedrich Berber Papers (henceforth Berber 
Papers), birth certificate Berber. Karl Heinz Voigt, ‘Die Methodistenkirche in Deutschland’, in Karl Steckel and 
Carl Ernst Sommer, eds., Geschichte der Evangelisch-methodistischen Kirche: Weg, Wesen und Auftrag des 
Methodismus unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der deutschsprachigen Länder Europas, Göttingen: Edition 
Ruprecht, 2007, 3rd ed., pp. 85-112. 
15 Berber, ‘Von der Gerechtigkeit’, p. 27. 
16 Berber left a rather self-serving autobiography. Where possible, I have consulted other evidence. Friedrich 
Berber, Zwischen Macht und Gewissen: Lebenserinnerungen, Munich: C.H. Beck, 1986, pp. 25-38; on Protestant 
internationalism see Christopher Clark and Michael Ledger-Lomas, ‘The Protestant International’, in Abigail 
Green and Vincent Viaene, eds., Religious internationals in the modern world: globalization and faith 
communities since 1750, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 23-52. 
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emphasis on the unmediated experience of Christ suited him.17 Such social connections 
enabled him to take extended study trips to the United States and Britain. After completing 
his law degree in 1926, Berber spent a year lecturing on international relations at a Quaker 
college in Birmingham, England. Having developed an interest in the problems of the British 
Empire as well as Gandhi’s philosophy, Berber wrote a doctoral dissertation on the legal 
relationship between Britain and the Dominions in the Commonwealth.18 
 For an international lawyer interested in gradations of civilizational hierarchy, the mid-
1920s British Empire and the legal equality between its constituent parts was a fascinating 
field of study. After the First World War the Dominions asserted their independence as they 
participated in the Paris Peace Conference and became full members of the League of 
Nations. The 1926 Balfour Declaration enshrined the principle of equality in inter-imperial 
relations but excluded India. A founding League member and thus an actor on the world 
stage, it had neither Dominion status nor self-government.19 Berber likened the League’s 
tolerance of Indian inequality to "a council of free men [that] does not object to one of them 
bringing his slave along, dressed up as a free man, and thereby surreptitiously doubling his 
master’s vote”.20 Indian nationalists also regarded the League as an instrument of colonial 
domination, which, according to Nehru, treated the “dependencies of an imperialist power” 
as “domestic matters” where international law did not apply.21 Relations between Britain and 
the Dominions had traditionally also been regarded as lying outside international law, a 
doctrine known as inter se. When Berber was writing his dissertation, however, inter se was 
breaking up, in particular due to Ireland’s pressure.22 Britain’s decision to withhold Dominion 
status from India was therefore a frustrating setback for advocates of Indian independence 
who had vested their hopes in international law.  
 Berber’s other early work reveals ambivalence towards British approaches to 
sovereignty and empire. While he criticised the way the British Empire treated those it did 
not regard as equals, the non-white colonies, the Irish and the Boers, and unequivocally 
denounced India’s colonial status, Berber lauded the non-coercive and organic nature of the 
                                                          
17 Arnold Toynbee, Acquaintances, London: Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 277. 
18 Library of the Religious Society of Friends, London, Horace Alexander Papers (henceforth LSF-HA), Temp. 
MSS 577/20, Horace Alexander to Girja Shankar Bajpai, Ministry of External Affairs, 28 December 1950 (copy). 
19 Stephen Legg, ‘An international anomaly? Sovereignty, the League of Nations and India's princely 
geographies’, Journal of Historical Geography, 43, 2014, pp. 96-110; William David McIntyre, The Britannic 
vision: historians and the making of the British Commonwealth of Nations, 1907-48, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2009; Daniel Gorman, The emergence of international society in the 1920s, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012. 
20 Friedrich Berber, Die Rechtsbeziehungen der britischen Dominions zum Mutterlande, Ansbach: Brügel, 1929, 
p. 15. 
21 R. P. Anand, ‘The formation of international organizations and India: a historical study’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 23, 1, 2010, pp. 5-21, at p. 14; see also Legg, ‘International anomaly’. 
22 Lorna Lloyd, ‘Loosening the apron strings’, The Round Table, 92, 369, 2003, pp. 279-303; Berber, 
Rechtsbeziehungen, p. 69. 
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British Commonwealth as an example of a peaceful loosening of imperial ties. To some 
extent liberal empire served as a blueprint for international government in Berber’s thinking 
even if he clearly saw through its patterns of exclusion.23 There were, he argued, different 
layers of hierarchy within imperial systems, and hybrid forms of sovereignty that emerged as 
a result. International legal structures served to reform and maintain empire precisely 
because they did not conform to the doctrine of sovereign equality.24 The evolution of the 
British Commonwealth showed that it was possible to build a discrete community that was 
recognisable in international law. An inherent instability at the heart of imperial international 
law opened the door to competing universalisms and regional subsystems. This, Berber 
implied, might be something that Germany could take advantage of when it re-joined the 
ranks of colonial powers. The British model, however, was only of limited use as the German 
state was animated by a different kind of “spirit”.25  
Regionalism was indeed a concept that some German jurists developed further in the 
1930s and 1940s. Carl Schmitt, the best-known example, argued for a world order of large 
spaces (Großraumordnung), with Germany as the dominant power in a European 
Großraum. According to Schmitt, multiple co-existing regional hegemons were capable of 
providing order beyond classical international law’s flawed universalism. Earlier in the 
twentieth century, the idea of regional legal orders had already been developed by Latin 
Americans who, as semi-peripheral actors, similarly fell through the fictitious categories of 
colonising nations and colonised non-nations and, like jurists on the Indian subcontinent, 
criticised the standard of civilization.26 Berber’s interpretation resembled the way semi-
peripheral actors appropriated international law for their own ends in proposing a 
particularistic conception of universality. 
With his unconventional interests, Berber’s entry into German academia was not 
straightforward. Leaving a secure job as a state prosecutor in the Bavarian legal system, 
Berber began teaching at the German Academy for Politics (Deutsche Hochschule für 
                                                          
23 Fritz Berber, ‘Die Dezentralisation des Britischen Reiches als Problem demokratischer Selbstverwaltung’, in 
Carl Schmitt et al., Probleme der Demokratie, Berlin: Rothschild, 1928, pp. 88-97. 
24 On British legal innovations that tried to deal with this problem see Benton, Search for Sovereignty; Karuna 
Mantena, Alibis of Empire: Henry Maine and the ends of liberal imperialism, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2010. 
25 Berber, ‘Dezentralisation’, p. 97. 
26 Stephen Legg, ed., Spatiality, sovereignty and Carl Schmitt: geographies of the nomos, London: Routledge, 
2011; Arnulf Becker Lorca, ‘Universal international law: nineteenth-century histories of imposition and 
appropriation’, Harvard International Law Journal, 51, 2, 2010, pp. 475-552; Liliana Obregón, ‘Completing 
civilization: Creole consciousness and international law in nineteenth-century Latin America’, in Anne Orford, 
ed., International law and its others, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 247-264, esp. p. 248; 
Arnulf Becker Lorca, ‘Eurocentrism in the history of international law’, in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters, 
The Oxford handbook of the history of international law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 1034-1057. 
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Politik) in 1930, outside the regular university system.27 The Berlin-based Hochschule had a 
cosmopolitan ethos, expressed in various international collaborations. At the time of Berber’s 
arrival, however, its leadership had to accommodate political pressure from nationalist 
circles and tried to allay fears of Hitler’s rise in the English-speaking world.28 In Berlin, 
Berber made scholarly contacts such as Rudolf Smend, Hermann Heller and Erich 
Kaufmann, the latter a proponent of natural law and legal adviser to the German Foreign 
Ministry. Like many Weimar jurists these scholars opposed legal positivism, a definition of 
law which restricted its sources to expressly recognised rules. According to anti-positivists 
this reduced the state to abstract norms bereft of their historical, political or ethical contexts, 
and produced an artificial separation of law and morality. Anti-positivism allowed scholars to 
blend law and policy. For international lawyers, heavily invested in a critique of the Versailles 
Treaty, this was appealing.29  
In the Third Reich, many of Berber’s mentors lost their academic posts due to racial 
or political persecution but he did not.30 Erich Kaufmann, for instance, was driven from his 
professorship because of his Jewish ancestry. Just before fleeing Germany in 1938 a 
desperate Kaufmann wrote to a friend, telling him that scholars still met at his house to 
discuss law and politics but not many were left from the Weimar days, “certainly not Fritz 
B”.31 Berber prospered under the Nazis. He was in touch with officials of the regime by 
August 1933 and there was a prospect of him being “called to more important work”, 
according to a British Quaker in whom Berber confided.32 In the years leading up to the 
Second World War, Berber furnished Hitler’s aggressive policies with legal arguments that 
drew on his earlier critique of liberal empire and rejection of legal positivism. 
 
Legalising Hitler’s empire 
Deploying law as a political weapon was a pillar of Nazi rule. The vast majority of German 
jurists who did not emigrate willingly cooperated with the regime. They challenged neither 
the Nazis’ euthanasia programme, nor the concentration camp system, nor the legal 
                                                          
27 Berber Papers, letter granting demission, 23 July 1930. 
28 Steven D. Korenblat, ‘A school for the republic? Cosmopolitans and their enemies at the Deutsche 
Hochschule für Politik, 1920-1933’, Central European History, 39, 3, 2006, pp. 394-430. 
29 Berber, Lebenserinnerungen, p. 53; Frieder Günther, Denken vom Staat her: die bundesdeutsche 
Staatsrechtslehre zwischen Dezision und Integration, 1949-1970, Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004, pp. 34-47; 
Michael Stolleis, A history of public law in Germany, 1914-1945, transl. Thomas Dunlap, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004, pp. 164-168. 
30 Mehring, Schmitt, pp. 313-315. 
31 Arnold Wolfers Papers, Stirling Memorial Library, Yale University, Box 2, Folder 21, Kaufmann to Wolfers, 7 
June 1938. 
32 Geoffrey Carnall, Gandhi’s interpreter: a life of Horace Alexander, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2010, p. 108, quoting Alexander. 
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persecution of Jews and other minorities.33 No aspect of the German legal system remained 
unaffected by Nazi ideology and international law was no exception. Otto Koellreutter, a 
prominent administrative lawyer and enthusiastic Nazi supporter, regarded it as “the most 
political part of the legal order”.34  
 Initially the regime embraced traditionalist conceptions that emphasised state 
sovereignty, self-determination and the equality of states. As Hitler’s foreign policy moved 
from acknowledging international law between 1933 and 1935, to selectively breaking it 
between 1935 and 1938 (rearmament, reoccupation of the Rhineland), and from then on 
denouncing its core claims by attacking the sovereignty of other states (Austria, 
Czechoslovakia), the divisions between conservative traditionalists and Nazi radicals 
crystallised. The latter substituted states with racial groups as the principal subjects of 
international law. As the norms governing German foreign relations had to emanate from the 
interests of the German people (Volk), binding rules could only exist where these interests 
coincided with generally accepted state behaviour. In practise, this interpretation justified 
disregarding international treaties and during the Second World War provided an apology for 
annihilationist warfare. The Nazi vision for international law meant the end of universality and 
created an inside/outside dichotomy which, as Michael Stolleis has observed, was not 
dissimilar to that of imperial international law’s standard of civilization, although it was 
overtly, instead of covertly, annihilationist.35 
 Berber joined the collective attempt by German jurists in the Third Reich to underpin 
Nazi rule with a coherent science of the state. He furthered his career as a member of 
relevant Nazi institutions (NS Rechtswahrerbund, NS Dozentenbund) and in 1937 entered 
the Nazi party.36 Within a few years of Hitler’s rise to power, Berber moved to the centre of 
Nazi foreign policy making, working at the intersection of international legal scholarship and 
propaganda. In 1934, Goebbels, the head of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry, put Berber in 
charge of a new department for international law and international relations at the 
Hochschule, instructing him to rebuild its international network.37 Within a year, Berber 
became a protégé of foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. In 1935, he was appointed 
acting director of the Hamburg Institut für Auswärtige Politik (Institute for Foreign Policy), the 
first German research body for international relations. Berber transferred it to Berlin to form 
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another foreign policy institute in 1937. Ribbentrop, who wanted to integrate research and 
propaganda functions, rewarded Berber with a professorship at the University of Berlin.38 
Berber also became a contributor to a key journal published by SS jurists that legitimated 
genocide.39 
While Berber was institutionally committed to National Socialism, his ideological 
adherence to the party line was questioned. Among the positions that German international 
lawyers embraced under the Nazis his might best be described as that of a liberal nationalist 
trying to adjust to new realities. Committed Nazis eyed him with suspicion and when he was 
considered for a professorial appointment in 1936 he was found to lack a “National-Socialist 
personality that was above challenge”. The assessment was based partly on Berber’s 1934 
study Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit (Security and Justice).40 With this book, which Berber 
described to a Quaker friend as giving “a strong expression to the new German Peace 
conception outside the League of Nations”, he hoped to establish his academic reputation, 
even planning for an English translation.41 
A polemic against liberal international law written in a religious key, the book’s 
argument can be summarised as follows: after the First World War, international law took a 
“soteriological” turn and became a quasi-theological theory of salvation. It encroached on 
areas which had hitherto been a part of international politics, notably the right to wage war. 
This new international law promoted the idea that inter-state conflict represented nothing but 
differences in opinion over how to interpret legal rules and constructed a “utopia” in which 
“all appearing conflicts are only disagreements about the interpretation of law which can be 
solved by a court operating under predictable certainty; these are attempts to turn world 
history into world adjudication, to turn domestic politics into constitutional jurisdiction”. 
Quoting Schmitt, Berber argued that such a “total legal order” (universelles 
Ordnungsprogramm) did not promote world peace but benefitted the victors of the world war 
by enshrining an unequal status quo as a universal order under the watchword of ‘security’.42 
These points were compatible with a traditionalist interpretation of international law as they 
emphasised Germany’s subdued position among European powers and the limitations of the 
League. 
Berber took this critique further by arguing that soteriological international law was 
based on a disenchanted rationality. “It is of key importance for the post-war soteriology that 
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salvation has not been based on subjectivity but objectivity: not a radically new ethos but a 
radically new global organisation; the centre of this new soteriology is not theology or ethics 
but the law as the rational form of organisation for humankind.” This, according to Berber, 
was not surprising, as “we have known since Max Weber that recent European history is 
distinct among all cultures in its attempt to disenchant the demonical possessions and 
irrationalities of life and to master them rationally”.43 Democracy represented the attempt to 
rationalise the power of the state. The (fateful) democratic control of foreign policy and the 
international legal control of state sovereignty were thus inextricably linked.  
But, and here Berber made a rhetorical move that positioned Germany outside the 
West, “the monopoly of the Western powers on a post-war soteriology was broken in front of 
the entire world; the soteriological character of German radical nationalism became 
apparent, but in a significantly harder, bitterer and more disillusioned key: German 
soteriology is not based on the unease of the disappointed victor or the new owner’s bad 
conscience but the plight of a beaten, humiliated, tormented and Lebensraum-deprived great 
and proud Volk.” German soteriology was built on völkisch assertiveness, not abstract rules, 
which only left a “modest role” for international law as a sometime “agent of justice”: “justice 
is a matter of mastery; it is the great art of tact and of wisdom in political matters, which, in a 
rationalistic, mechanistic and materialistic age has almost completely been lost”.44 By 
insisting on the existence of an elusive justice, which only subaltern Germans could grasp, 
Berber performed a kind of “self-Orientalization” that found its parallels in coterminous 
discussions among German geo-politicians.45 Anti-colonial nationalists, for their part, rarely 
believed that European fascism had anything to offer to colonial peoples. Nehru, for 
example, regarded fascism and imperialism as variants of the same ideology.46 
At the same time Berber recommended exploiting international law to project an 
alternative political philosophy. Berber called this approach the “politics of international law” 
(Völkerrechtspolitik). Anticipating Schmitt, who declared a “war of international legal studies” 
(völkerrechtswissenschaftlicher Kampf) on universalist international law, Berber argued that 
international law was, and should be, inherently political.47 Berber said little about the actual 
political values a reformed international law should be based on. He did not provide a 
definition of international justice, the norm destined to take the place of security. What justice 
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was would be determined on the grounds of political realities and “scholarship” would put its 
“counsel at the disposal of political practice”. Elite Anglo-American think tanks served as 
models for effective political work in international law.48 Blending liberal internationalist 
techniques with Nazi foreign policy aims, Berber discounted universal international law as a 
decisive force in international politics and anticipated the disciplinary turn to international 
relations which would be completed by other lawyers of his generation, notably Hans 
Morgenthau.49 
Sicherheit und Gerechtigkeit was a highly ambiguous study and it was received 
accordingly. There were damning reviews by Nazi lawyers who doubted that Berber’s 
conception of international law could deliver for the Nazi state.50 Emigré scholars regarded 
the book as a foundational text of Nazi legal scholarship.51 An American reviewer conceded 
that Berber was right in his diagnosis of the current fragile state of international law but 
diagnosed a “typically National Socialist conception of international law” in the rejection of 
international institutions.52 One British supporter of appeasement, E.H. Carr, quoted the 
book favourably in his seminal realist international relations text The Twenty Years’ Crisis.53 
In his emphasis on the state as the basic entity of international relations, Berber formulated a 
core claim of the realist school as it was developed by Carr and others.54 For all its 
contradictions, the book spoke to a broad political spectrum and it enhanced Berber’s 
reputation abroad. 
To understand how Berber’s critique of international law translated into politics it is 
important to analyse his propaganda work from the mid-1930s. Berber published numerous 
articles and document editions defending Hitler’s foreign policy as compliant with 
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international law.55 In a 1936 lecture to foreign students he justified German rearmament and 
the re-occupation of the Rhineland as a reaction to the Western powers’ failure to honour 
their promise to disarm. This turned Hitler’s unilateral abrogation of international treaties into 
norm-creating acts.56 Berber also kept a watchful eye on the liberal empires’ relationship with 
the League, revelling in the legal quandaries that the British and French governments found 
themselves in during the Abyssinia Crisis when neither intended to apply Article 16 of the 
League Covenant against the Italian aggressor as it went against their interests. Legality, a 
hallmark of the post-1919 order, had come back to bite its creators as “it is the ruse of law 
that, born out of a concrete constellation of interests, it can, because it is formulated 
generally, become a weapon for and against anybody to whom the prerequisites apply”.57  
The 1930s were a decade of crisis for international law and institutions and Berber’s 
analysis found admirers among disaffected liberal internationalists and legal sceptics 
abroad. He successfully targeted Anglophone elites and their think tanks, using League of 
Nations-affiliated institutions, and building on his insights into the increased importance of 
objectivity and rationality in the foreign policy making of modern liberal democracies. This 
distinguished him from his peers in the German legal community. Berber used the network of 
the International Studies Conference (ISC), a federation of foreign policy research institutes 
and think tanks which held annual conferences under the auspices of the League of Nations 
between 1928 and 1939. Both the Hamburg and the Berlin institutes had been founder 
members but disaffiliated when Germany left the League in 1933.58 Berber now reversed this 
process. He attended the 1935 International Studies Conference in London as an observer 
and ensured that his Berlin institute became a corresponding member of the ISC.59 He and 
his staff continued to participate in the conferences, and managed to add issues which were 
of particular concern to Nazi Germany to the official programme.60 In effect Berber used the 
ISC as a launch pad to enmesh himself in a transnational network of international relations 
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specialists, spanning the United States, the British Empire and most of Europe, and financed 
by American philanthropic foundations.61  
Berber established himself and his institutes as the key German interlocutors of this 
network: he gave lectures at the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment in Paris and 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, and invited high-profile speakers to 
come to Germany, most notably the Institute’s Director of Studies Arnold Toynbee in 1936.62 
Other organisations were also targeted, for instance the Geneva Research Center, an 
international research institute financed by American foundations.63 As governing board 
member Berber vetoed inconvenient research (e.g. on sanctions in 1937) and asked “to be 
consulted in advance concerning all texts which might refer in any way to German policies or 
activities.”64 He also objected to commissioning German refugee scholars with writing 
studies for the centre, thereby ensuring that there would be only one German voice.65 
Finally, he used his Quaker connections to assemble a small British pro-appeasement circle 
of influential pacifists, the “Group for Anglo-German Understanding”. Although British interest 
in the group declined from 1935 Berber continued to meet with Quakers in Germany until 
finally breaking off contact in 1939.66 Through his participation in transnational scholarly 
networks at both personal and institutional levels, Berber became the privileged interlocutor 
from the Nazi sphere of international law to liberal internationalism. Liberals were interested 
in this exchange for political and intellectual reasons and committed their own transgressions 
by engaging in it. 
 One issue that was particularly salient in this context was colonial appeasement, an 
attempt led by British liberals to conciliate Nazi Germany with a new colonial settlement in 
Africa. Berber had consistently demanded international equality for Nazi Germany, declaring 
at international conferences that “outsiders continued to regard [Germany] ... as a fascist 
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state, as a totalitarian state or as a dictatorship. It [i]s none of these things.” 67 If Germany 
was just like any other European great power it needed colonies which it would administer 
capably: “if we did do as other nations and accepted this terrible white man’s burden, we 
should not break down under it.”68 Arguments that justified the colonial claims of the Western 
powers, such as the need for raw materials, were similarly taken apart by Berber who 
insisted that colonies were a matter of national prestige.69 Ribbentrop was fixated on gaining 
African colonies and Berber likely acted on his orders when he convinced Toynbee to 
support German colonial claims.70 The era of colonial appeasement which had culminated in 
a British ‘colonial offer’ to Hitler in 1938 ended with Austria’s Anschluss and Germany’s 
dismantling of Czechoslovakia. It now became clear that Germany was not like other 
European powers and that the empire it sought to build in the East would not be based on 
negotiation. 
 Berber’s Second World War began on a triumphant note. Shortly after the fall of 
France he wrote a letter to a Rockefeller official, advising him that “the situation in Europe 
has changed considerably and I am sure that even groups and persons who until now had 
thought that it was possible to do researchwork (sic) on the future of the international 
Organisation of Europe and the world without Germany’s participation have now learned 
better.”71 Berber’s output in the first years of the war, apart from several tendentious 
document editions, was indeed concerned with bolstering a new European order under 
German leadership.72 Firstly, Berber contributed to this project in practical ways as his 
institute produced a series of strategic memoranda for the German Foreign Ministry 
(Materialien zur Neuordnung) as well as a “Europe handbook”.73 Ribbentrop also put him in 
charge of the League of Nation’s International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation in Paris, 
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seat of the ISC secretariat, to implement the New Order on the level of intellectual 
cooperation.74  
 Secondly, Berber developed a blueprint for the new German empire in articles 
published in the early 1940s in which he turned to Europeanist rhetoric. After Hitler’s attack 
on the Soviet Union and American entry into the war, Nazi ideologues intensified their 
attempts to justify the war as one to defend and unite Europe against the twin forces of 
Bolshevism and Anglo-American imperialism. Although the ulterior motives seemed obvious, 
this discourse was remarkably successful among some West Europeans such as Hendrik de 
Man.75 Berber himself extolled the Holy Roman Empire as a model for a united Europe, a 
“community of [the] free peoples” of Western Christendom. Historical German leadership in 
the Empire, elevated by Berber to “a grave sacrifice in the interest of Occidental unity, more 
sacrificial than England’s proclaimed ‘white man’s burden’ in the dark continent” provided 
free expression to Europe’s peoples in a unified realm and gave the German Volk a 
“universalist heritage” that “plays a special role today”. Berber’s idealised pluralism 
camouflaged the radically different ways in which the Nazis treated conquered peoples in 
Western and Eastern Europe and indirectly justified strategies of enslavement and 
eradication: “How different is already today the legal situation of the Protectorate, the 
Generalgouvernement, of Ostland, of Slovakia, Croatia, Norway, Denmark, France, 
Hungary, Italy, the Reich in an already embryonically existing European New Order!”76 
He also sought to distinguish himself from Carl Schmitt’s Großraum concept which 
he criticised as “too imperalistic”, even if Berber adopted other Schmittian terms such as 
raumfremde Macht, a power foreign to a Großraum.77 Although Berber would later use this 
divergence as evidence of his anti-Nazi convictions (although he published them at a time 
when Schmitt had lost much of his influence), it is more likely that he simply threw his hat 
into the ring of the debates that accompanied the improvised and violent process of building 
Hitler’s empire.78 The interesting point about this disagreement beyond the well-documented 
antipathy between the two jurists consists of Berber’s insistence that a Greater Germany 
ought to try its best to not be perceived as an empire.79 Again, the British Commonwealth 
served as a model as it “wisely avoided giving the leading power Great Britain a title that 
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would have loudly announced it as such”.80 Berber’s ideas for a non-coercive European 
federation under German leadership utterly jarred with reality. He published them at a critical 
point in the timeline of the Holocaust, just after the mass murder of Europe’s Jews had been 
planned by the Nazis at the Wannsee Conference. Whether his proposals were a particularly 
subtle way of registering dissent (as Berber himself claimed after 1945) is hard to ascertain 
but what is significant about them is the way in which Berber insisted that law, empire and 
German universalism could be fused together. 
Berber himself became increasingly embroiled in the vicious infighting within the 
polycratic Nazi foreign policy system and decided to pursue his ‘politics of international law’ 
elsewhere. After a blackmailing attempt by an SS officer who knew about Berber’s 
involvement with religious internationalism, Berber convinced Ribbentrop to send him to 
Geneva permanently.81 Here, Berber turned to humanitarian international law for the 
purposes of the German war effort as a legal adviser at the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC). At Ribbentrop’s behest Berber surveyed prospects for a separate peace 
with Britain, and initiated an ICRC proposal to establish no-bombing zones for civilian 
populations which the Allies rejected as Germany would have been the major beneficiary. 
The basic idea, however, was taken up in the 1949 Geneva Convention.82  
Berber also engaged in what he later described as ‘humanitarian missions’ that 
furnished him with a post-war alibi.83 Attempts to settle in Switzerland after the war failed as 
the authorities expelled Berber to the French zone of Allied-occupied Germany where he first 
worked as a defence lawyer and then as a legal adviser to the French military government. 
In 1949 he emerged from his own de-nazification tribunal as a fellow traveller (Mitläufer) but 
was barred from an academic post.84 Berber’s career, for a long time dedicated to the 
doomed attempt to bring Hitler’s aggressive bid for a race-based empire into alignment with 
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an approach to liberal international law that took advantage of its internal contradictions, had 
reached a dead end.  
 
India, international law and new imperial logics 
After 1945, the configurations of law and empire shifted again. The ease with which Hitler 
had broken international agreements and defied international organisations had made the 
fragility of the post-1919 international legal order painfully obvious. The horrors of the 
Holocaust and the enormous loss of civilian life during the Second World War underlined 
international law’s failure to protect individual human beings. Nazi rule in Europe and 
Japan’s military successes against the British, French and Dutch empires in Asia irreparably 
damaged the legitimacy of European colonial rule. By the end of the 1940s, India, Pakistan, 
Ceylon, Burma, Syria, Jordan and Indonesia were sovereign states intent on using their 
newly-won status to dismantle the colonial order. International law had to respond to these 
challenges. It did so, albeit tentatively. The Allied governments established international 
tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo to prosecute Axis war criminals but many lawyers 
criticised the verdicts as ex-post facto law. Under the aegis of the United Nations, 
governments committed themselves to upholding human rights but only in the non-binding 
1948 Universal Declaration. The UN Charter lacked a firm commitment to decolonization, 
and its trusteeship system, which replaced the League of Nations mandates, was initially 
opposed by European powers. Instead of strengthening international law the Allies built the 
new international order on the basis of power politics.85 
 All this was not lost on Berber. His views on international law in the early Cold War 
embraced power politics but also toyed with the idea of reforming international law ‘from 
below’. Awaiting his denazification tribunal, he reached out to his old Quaker contacts. One 
of them visited Berber in Baden-Baden in 1948. Discussing the recent communist takeover 
in Czechoslovakia Berber asserted that the “country was undoubtedly recognised at Yalta as 
being within the Russian sphere of influence” and the sovereignty of small nations a casualty 
of international law’s diminished role. But he also recognised that it was necessary to rebuild 
international law’s normative authority which could not be done by discredited European 
governments. Berber declared that “spiritual power alone can now save the world – the 
power that is more prevalent in the East, in India and China, evidenced by Gandhi’s life and 
methods, and which is largely lacking in the West”, a statement that resonated with a 
German Orientalist tradition that had often sought to appropriate ‘Eastern’ traits. Berber’s 
expressed desire to “go to India and co-operate there” with the Quakers represented more 
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than a careerist’s desperate move in a difficult situation.86 It also reflected a shrewd 
understanding of who possessed moral authority in a decolonizing world. 
 In this new constellation Indians emerged as the most vocal representatives of the 
anti-colonial cause. They used international institutions as a platform but remained sceptical 
of international law as it had been shaped by the great powers. When the Indian delegation 
to the United Nations famously charged South Africa with racial discrimination in the first 
session of the General Assembly, it did so in contravention of the domestic jurisdiction 
clause in the charter.87 Indian jurists made their mark in the post-war legal order, none more 
so than Radhabinod Pal, one of the three dissenting judges at the Tokyo International 
Military Tribunal which opened in 1946. Pal not only denied that the charges brought against 
the Japanese defendants were legitimate but questioned the motives of the prosecuting 
powers and argued that outlawing crimes against peace could be used to withhold justice 
from colonial peoples. As German jurists had done in the interwar years, Pal objected to the 
use of law for upholding an inequitable status quo.88  
 Of course, both episodes occurred before or shortly after India attained formal 
sovereignty in 1947. From then on, Indian jurists and policy makers had to wrestle explicitly 
with what B.S. Chimni has called the “double life of international law”. International law 
conferred formal sovereignty on states emerging from colonialism but continued to exist as a 
system of rules structured by the standard of civilization. Thus it represented both an 
instrument of liberation and of domination. Radical alternatives, such as that advanced by 
Nazi Germany, were utterly discredited after 1945. “Mainstream liberal international law was 
the only game in town; even the Soviet scholars struggled with it.” Like other Third World 
scholars, Indian jurists tried to reform international law from within, ridding it of its colonial 
heritage and demonstrating that indigenous traditions aligned with international legal 
principles. India’s foreign policy reflected this dualist relationship with international law as it 
used international institutions to channel national interests in the absence of military or 
economic might. At the same time, it retained a critical distance from those same institutions, 
evidenced, for instance by its role in the Non-Aligned Movement.89  
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 Independent India’s attempts to wield normative power within the international 
system occurred against the backdrop of regional conflict and the politics of the emerging 
Cold War. The partition of British India had resulted in a violent territorial dispute between 
India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Britain and the United States generally favoured Pakistan’s 
case, mostly because they regarded the country as an indispensable ally in the conflict with 
the Soviet Union. After India submitted the Kashmir dispute to the UN Security Council in 
January 1948 Anglo-American partisanship became evident. Philip Noel-Baker, a leading 
liberal internationalist in the interwar years and now Britain’s representative during the UN 
discussions, emphatically took Pakistan’s side in the Security Council. Nehru deeply 
regretted taking the dispute to the UN which he regarded as being ‘run’ by the United States 
and Britain.90 The experience would inform his approach to a related dispute over the use of 
the Indus canal waters.  
The 1947 partition had created two sovereign states and imposed political 
boundaries onto an interconnected irrigation system providing water from the Indus river 
system to the agricultural lands of East Punjab (India) and West Punjab (Pakistan). West 
Punjab depended on water from across the border, as five of the six main tributaries of the 
Indus rise in India. Initially, temporary agreements regulated the water supply to Pakistan but 
it became clear that a permanent intergovernmental agreement was needed when the 
government of East Punjab stopped the supply in 1948. India and Pakistan signed the Inter-
Dominion Agreement of May 1948, which released water to Pakistan against payments but 
the wider conflict between the two states ensured that the dispute remained unresolved.91 
Postcolonial sovereignty turned what would have been a domestic quarrel into an 
international dispute. 
Pakistani officials recognised that international law might offer a way to gain the 
upper hand in a conflict in which geography was on India’s side. In 1949, Pakistan proposed 
submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice, another UN body, hoping to 
better its position resulting from the Inter-Dominion Agreement. India categorically refused to 
involve the Court.92 But Pakistan attempted to mobilise other institutions in its favour. In 
October 1949, Pakistan submitted a draft resolution to the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the 
UN calling upon the International Law Commission to include the topic of international rivers 
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in its list of topics for codification.93 Although the resolution was not adopted, involving the 
International Law Commission was a way of getting international legal experts drawn into the 
issue. The Indian government was acutely aware of these efforts. A transcript of the Sixth 
Committee’s meeting minutes is preserved in the Indian National Archives, along with 
detailed instructions on how to publicly refute Pakistan’s invocations of international law.94 
Indian foreign policy was now presented with a delicate problem: how to reject claims made 
under international law by another postcolonial nation.  
The nature of this task explains Berber’s move into the heart of Indian foreign policy 
in the early 1950s. As in the 1930s, his Quaker connections were crucial. After the Second 
World War the Quakers founded humanitarian ‘embassies’ in strategic points, one of them 
being Calcutta.95 A close Quaker friend of Berber’s, Horace Alexander, was heavily involved 
in the politics of postcolonial India and went on several fact-finding missions to Kashmir 
between 1948 and 1950, reporting directly to Nehru.96 Alexander also became concerned 
with the canal waters dispute.97 As the conflict took on a legal dimension, he saw an opening 
for Berber. In November 1950, three months after Pakistan declared the Inter-Dominion 
Agreement null and void, Alexander approached the Governor-General of India, who was 
looking for a specialist in the law of international waterways. Berber did not fit this description 
but Alexander praised his legal expertise and personal commitment: “he is not merely trying 
to run away from a difficult situation, but he sees an opportunity of serving the cause of 
peace and goodwill.”98 In January 1951, Berber accepted the Indian government’s offer to go 
to New Delhi as a legal adviser.99 
Outwardly an odd choice, Berber was particularly suited to the job. He understood 
intra-imperial relations as a part of international law which sensitised him to the pre-Partition 
complexities of the dispute. India’s post-independence foreign policy strove to establish the 
country as a ‘moral power’, even if Nehru remained conscious of the limits of moral capital in 
international politics.100 Thus India could not afford to be seen flouting international law and 
needed an adviser adept at juggling legal concepts and political realities. As a German, 
Berber remained sufficiently remote from the interests of the former colonial power, or the 
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United States, which in the early 1950s laid the groundwork for a military alliance with 
Pakistan. At the same time, West-Germany established closer ties with India, the key 
country in its attempt to persuade developing countries not to extend diplomatic recognition 
to the GDR.101 When Berber eventually returned to a German professorship, his appointment 
was supported by the West-German ambassador in New-Delhi who stressed that it would 
bolster FRG-Indian relations as well as “our interests globally”.102 Like other experts at this 
time Berber went to ‘help’ India as a representative of the West, an inherently Eurocentric 
move. However, this West was less unified than many Cold Warriors would have liked to 
believe. 
India’s strategy in the canal waters dispute focused on achieving a political solution 
while seizing the moral higher ground, an objective complicated by the increased 
interweaving of international law with developmental logics. In a 1951 article the New Dealer 
David Lilienthal alerted the American public to the dispute. His call to internationalise and 
develop the water resources of the Indus river system involved the World Bank which offered 
its good offices for mediation. This was an American attempt to find a ‘technical’ solution to 
the problem, modelled on the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States. Ultimately, 
though, the World Bank discussions did not result in internationalisation but an affirmation of 
state sovereignty. The trilateral negotiations which began in 1952 only resulted in a treaty 
between India and Pakistan in 1960 as both countries presented irreconcilable plans for the 
economic development of the Indus basin. In the end, the tributaries were divided between 
India and Pakistan with new canals giving both countries additional access to water. Major 
building projects were to be financed by an Indus Basin Development Fund, which the World 
Bank, co-signatory to the treaty, set up.103  
As part of the Indian World Bank delegation Berber stressed that the preamble to an 
eventual treaty should highlight the moral dimension of the case. Such invocations of 
morality were strategic, as a letter Berber wrote to Arnold Toynbee in 1953 suggests: 
“Fundamentally, the situation of my present task is not altogether different from former tasks. 
Lip service to Gandhian principles combined with Neo-Asian Machiavellism is not an 
altogether enviable situation.”104 But Berber also decided to use elements of the post-1945 
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legal imaginary, which divided the world into developed and under-developed nations, to 
bolster India’s claims. 
As the dispute went on, Berber presented India as a potential poster child for Third 
World development. “In view of the large undeveloped areas in the Indus basin in an India 
subject to famine, the acute food shortage in the above mentioned Indian regions of the 
Indus system and the disproportionately low utilization in India of the waters of the Indus 
system available in her territory, India is vitally interested in increasing her present utilization, 
whilst Pakistan ... not only wishes to maintain its existing utilization but also to increase this 
considerably.”105 Thus, India’s greater needs for development should take priority. However, 
slotting India into a developmental hierarchy entailed accepting Western epistemologies that 
linked sovereignty to economic growth.106 Berber’s arguments indirectly affirmed India’s 
inferiority in a Eurocentric international legal system, even while they attempted to secure 
political advantage. 
This is also apparent in other writings in which Berber criticised Anglophone authors 
for dismissing the international law of ancient India as not ‘real’: “considering the indelibly 
linked unity of law, morality and religion in the old Indic codes... the old Indian law of nations 
had a higher chance of being adhered to than modern international law“. Western 
international law’s failings were apparent as it had allowed the bombing of civilians (in Nazi 
Germany) and the use of atomic weapons (against Japan) and was fundamentally rooted in 
colonial conquest. Only the “fanatical Mohammedans of the Near East and the xenophobic 
Mongols of the Far East were able to assert their independent statehood against European 
colonialism” while “the mild, nonviolent believers in international law, the peoples of the 
Indian Kulturwelt on the continent and the islands became the prey of European 
conquerors”. Fusing Orientalist stereotypes with a critique of Western international law, 
Berber argued that a moribund European colonialism, “a conception in international law 
which was from the beginning irreconcilable with the vital rights of non-European peoples”, 
now had to give way to a new order based on different values, such as ahimsa, the old Indic 
principle of non-violence.107 Whether Berber truly thought Eastern values would triumph 
remains doubtful but his appropriation of them is significant. 
Meanwhile liberal international law really was the only game in town. Western 
institutions remained prominent in another soft power strategy used by India in the water 
dispute, namely influencing the emerging scholarly consensus on the substance of 
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international water law. A focal point here was the International Law Association (ILA), an 
influential non-governmental body founded in 1873, during the highpoint of imperial 
international law. In 1954 the ILA created a special river law committee on which India and 
Pakistan both had several representatives and which included the American John Laylin, 
Pakistan’s legal adviser in the canal dispute. Unsurprisingly, the Indians argued that states 
should be free to develop their water use according to their needs while the Pakistanis 
emphasized the priority of existing uses.108 Berber also joined the committee and published 
a book in which he argued that there was no such thing as a global customary water law. 
Any future law would have to be based on the outcome of political negotiations: “The motley 
diversity exhibited by water treaties is nothing other than a reflection of the motley diversity 
of international relations in general.”109 Thus he prepared the ground for the eventual treaty. 
After securing a professorship in Munich in 1954, Berber continued to work for the 
Indian government, influencing the ILA rivers committee.110 An opinion he submitted to the 
ILA in 1957 (which was circulated by the Indian foreign ministry to its missions) reiterated the 
unsettled nature of international water law in a world which had only recently recognised the 
sovereign equality of many nations.111 The political purpose behind Berber’s treatise was to 
delay agreement within the ILA on the rules of river law before Pakistan finally agreed to sign 
the Indus Water Treaty in 1960. The ILA only adopted the Helsinki Rules on international 
river law in 1966, a compromise between the Indian and Pakistani positions. Berber’s 
scholarly offensive ensured that state practice, i.e. the outcome of concrete negotiations 
between India and Pakistan, would shape future legal principles and not vice versa.  
 
Conclusion 
At the end of his career, Friedrich Berber was thoroughly integrated into West-Germany’s 
intellectual and political mainstream as well as the international legal community through his 
continued membership in the ILA. Newspaper articles honoured him as a member of 
Munich’s academic elite, a trustee of a prestigious endowment for gifted students, and a 
valued advisor to the Indian government.112 Occasionally he issued subtly subversive 
statements challenging the idea that the Federal Republic was an integral part of the ‘West’ 
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under American leadership, for instance when he compared Germany’s dependent status 
after 1945 to that of a mandate under the League of Nations.113  He also revisited the Holy 
Roman Empire as a model for international integration under German leadership, suggesting 
that it offered valuable lessons to a world divided by the Cold War.114 Such comments went 
against the grain not so much of an international law capable of underpinning imperial orders 
but against the Anglo-American privilege of writing the rulebook. But for all the attacks on 
liberal international law Berber had launched in the course of his long life, he did not turn his 
back on it. 
 This was because, fundamentally, Germans occupied a privileged position in a 
Eurocentric international legal order as they were both part of the West and not. Ideas of 
civilizational hierarchies lingered on in the post-1945 era which was marked by sovereign 
independence and inequality. Berber’s broadsides against European colonialism 
notwithstanding, while he posed as an oppositional international lawyer he behaved like a 
typical Cold War technocrat, acting as the imperial logic of international law would predict. 
His insistence on the primacy of politics and the ‘ruse’ of international law made him accept 
developmental logics which positioned India as an aspiring nation not yet possessing full 
sovereignty. The very idea of Berber tutoring Indians in how to game the rules of 
international law confirmed that those were the only relevant rules. Berber’s actions were 
underpinned by a belief in civilizational hierarchies and a deep-seated Orientalism which 
dwelled on ‘timeless’ Indian values and idealised Ghandi, only to be disappointed when 
confronted with Nehruvian power politics. The fact that he hardly changed any of his core 
arguments during his career, the primacy of politics in international law, the importance of 
spiritual values, the disruptive potential of the subaltern, underlines that it was possible for 
Berber to simultaneously participate in racist and imperial projects and resist being 
subsumed within a uniform, hegemonic discourse of Western international law. 
 Is there no escape from imperial international law? In the case of this jurist who 
chose to analyse the international system from the perspective of two disruptive powers the 
answer is no. At historically specific junctures both Indians and Germans believed that 
international law was structured in a way which stacked the odds against them but also that 
these structures could be broken up and remoulded according to radically different norms. 
This attitude is visible in the Nazi’s murderous attempt to build a New Order in Europe as 
well as India’s insistence that it would be possible to shape the international system 
according to alternative logics that bypassed Cold War realities. In both cases, ideas about 
order were inextricably linked to their legal expressions and operated in a system of power in 
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which Western norms were at the centre. And in both cases, the actors wanted to usurp the 
normative power of Western international law, not abolish it. Searching for the critical 
instability at the heart of international law, we might be well advised to look sideways, not so 
much at an opposition between West and rest but at the long continuities of empire, power 
differentials, racism, and civilizational hierarchies which create a much more complex and 
contradictory ordering. 
  
 
